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INTRODUCTION
On the day the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the Affordable Care Act1 drew
massive attention, a less publicized ruling displayed a striking feature of the Court’s
recent First Amendment jurisprudence. In United States v. Alvarez,2 the Court over-
turned the respondent’s conviction for violating the Federal Stolen Valor Act by falsely
claiming to hold the Congressional Medal of Honor.3 However “contemptible”4 this
* John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.
Chelsea Enright and Haley Van Erem provided valuable research assistance.
1 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The Court sustained
the Act’s individual mandate for health insurance coverage, though it struck down a penalty for
states electing not to participate in the Act’s expansion of Medicaid. Id. at 2600–01, 2608.
2 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
3 Id. at 2551. All of the cases summarized in this Introduction are discussed in greater detail
later in the Article.
4 Id. (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). Justices Breyer and Kagan concurred in the judgment.
Id. Justice Alito dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 2556.
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apparent “pathetic attempt to gain respect”5 might seem to most, Alvarez’s unequiv-
ocal lie fell within the sphere of expression guarded by the First Amendment. Justice
Kennedy’s plurality opinion noted the similarity between Alvarez’s falsehood and
speech the Court addressed in its previous term in Snyder v. Phelps.6 Both involved
statements that “can disparage, or attempt to steal, honor that belongs to those who
fought for this Nation in battle.”7 In Snyder, Phelps and other members of his church
were held liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress for picketing the funeral
of a soldier killed in the line of duty; their signs’ central theme was that deaths of
American soldiers and other devastations reflected God’s wrath for the nation’s toler-
ance of homosexuality, especially in the military.8 There, too, Justices left little doubt
of their dim estimate of the disputed speech9—among the signs’ proclamations were
“Thank God for 9/11,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and “God Hates Fags”10—even
as they found the signs shielded by the First Amendment.11
While Alvarez and Snyder present vivid examples of protecting “the thought that
we hate,”12 they do not amount to isolated phenomena. In four other cases in the
Court’s last three terms, the Court has likewise struck down restrictions on what could
be regarded as “secondary” speech.13 The term as used here refers to types of expression
that the government seeks to restrict on colorable grounds that such expression causes
harm14 and is of such a nature as not to merit full-blown First Amendment recognition.15
5 Id. at 2542 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
6 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011); see Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542.
7 132 S. Ct. at 2542.
8 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213–14.
9 See id. at 1220 (describing picketing as “certainly hurtful” and suggesting that the church
could be considered “morally flawed” and its contribution to public discourse “negligible”);
see also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (describing picketing in Snyder as “hateful protests”).
10 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213.
11 Id. at 1219. Justice Alito was the lone dissenter in Snyder. Id. at 1212.
12 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
13 See infra notes 18–27 and accompanying text.
14 For a discussion of the role of harm in Snyder and in two other cases discussed in this
Article—Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011), and United States v. Stevens,
130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010)—see Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP.
CT. REV. 81, 84–93.
15 The concept of secondary speech should be distinguished from the Court’s famous enu-
meration in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), of forms of speech—e.g., ob-
scenity and “‘fighting’ words”—that categorically warrant no protection because they “are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Id. at 572. (Chaplinsky is dis-
cussed at text accompanying note 373 infra.) Secondary expression, by contrast, describes the
state’s contention, rather than a First Amendment tenet, and includes speech that the government
asserts deserves lesser protection rather than none at all. In the latter sense, it resembles Cass
Sunstein’s identification of “low value speech” whose restriction is subject to less scrutiny than
“core” expression. See Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV.
555, 555, 559 (1989) (setting forth criteria for distinguishing high-value speech from low-
value speech). But see Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (1989)
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In each of these six cases, the state16 could argue plausibly—if unsuccessfully—that
relative to its cost, the disputed speech failed to appreciably advance the principal aims
of freedom of speech: to facilitate the search for truth, to promote democratic self-
government, and to protect individual self-realization.17 In the first of the cases to be
decided, United States v. Stevens,18 the Court invalidated a conviction for selling videos
of dogfighting on the basis of the facial invalidity of a federal ban on depictions of
animal cruelty.19 The next term, in addition to Snyder, the Court rejected two other at-
tempts to limit expression of purportedly subordinate rank. In Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc.,20 the Court struck down a Vermont law that sought to curb the commercial ex-
ploitation by pharmaceutical companies of information acquired about the prescribing
practices of individual physicians.21 Absent express consent by prescribers, the law for-
bade the sale by pharmacies to data-mining companies, and by data-mining companies
to pharmaceutical companies, of “prescriber-identifiable data . . . for any commercial
purpose.”22 A few days later, the Court, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association,23 invalidated a statute that barred the sale or rental of “violent video
games” to minors and required their packaging to be labeled “18.”24 And shortly before
issuing its decision in Alvarez last term, the Court, in FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc.,25 found impermissibly vague the FCC’s policy against “broadcast indecency”26
as applied to actions taken against networks for three incidents that aired on broad-
cast television.27
These six decisions display not only general resistance to deeming secondary
speech unworthy of normal First Amendment safeguards, but also speech-protective
resolutions of dualities that recur in constitutional jurisprudence. Part I of this Article
examines this pattern in the context of classification: the Court’s threshold choice of
alternatives of what the case is “about.” Also present in a number of the cases is a
(criticizing the project of making this distinction). Again, however, secondary speech—as
illustrated in the cases discussed in this Article—encompasses speech whose arguably deficient
value did not persuade the Court to uphold its restriction.
16 The state in this context comprises government generally, including federal statutes and
administrative regulations as well as state courts’ enforcement of common law.
17 These rationales for protecting speech can be found in myriad judicial opinions and schol-
arly works. Perhaps their best-known collective articulation appears in Thomas I. Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878–87 (1963).
18 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
19 Id. at 1592; see 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006).
20 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
21 Id. at 2659.
22 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2011).
23 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
24 Id. at 2741–42; see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2009).
25 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
26 Indus. Guidance on Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999 (2001).
27 132 S. Ct. at 2309–10.
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contrast between vigorous and mild versions of protective doctrines relevant to the
case; Part II traces the Court’s enforcement of the robust forms of these doctrines.
Part III addresses a central problem of jurisprudence as it appears among these cases:
the application of precedent. A number of the cases turn largely on the proper scope
of a salient precedent’s core meaning, and the Court has preferred both the breadth of
interpretations protecting speech and the narrowness of constructions allowing its
denial. Additionally, as with specific precedent, history more broadly can lend itself
to either sustaining or constricting constitutional rights. Part IV describes the Court’s
invocation of historical boundaries to deflect restrictions on speech, and highlights
the Court’s refusal in each of these three terms—in Stevens, Brown, and Alvarez—to
augment the list of historically established categories of unprotected expression. A
final realm where competing modes of analysis typically produce antithetical results
is the choice between deference and skepticism toward asserted factual predicates for
banning speech. As discussed in Part V, the Court in these cases did not hesitate to
reject justifications for speech prohibitions urged by the government.
I. CHOOSING A SUITABLE CONSTRUCT: THE DECISIVE ROLE OF CLASSIFICATION
Constitutional outcomes often hinge on the conceptual lens through which the
Court views the issue before it. Rather than simply competing constructions of cases or
doctrines, a case may offer alternative frameworks for understanding and resolving the
case. Where secondary speech is involved, the difference can be over the character of
the banned expression, the nature of its prohibition, or even a less well-defined but
discernible sense of the underlying subject matter involved. The cases examined here
present instances in each of these areas where the Court’s choice led to invalidation
of restrictions.
A. Defining the Speech at Issue
One way to reduce or qualify First Amendment protection is to view the essence
of speech at issue as not amounting to pure expression, but rather largely comprising
conduct.28 Another is to assign the speech to a category that, while acknowledged as
expressive, is readily subject to rational restriction.29 The group of recent cases involv-
ing secondary speech includes the Court’s rejection of both of these strategies.
1. Words as Conduct
The notion that some utterances are subject to restriction because they do not func-
tion primarily as expression is not new. For example, “fighting words” have been
28 This concept should be distinguished from its inverse, symbolic speech, under which con-
duct intended to convey a message is accorded a limited degree of First Amendment protection
because of its expressive elements. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)
(rejecting “the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ when-
ever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea”).
29 See id. at 376–77.
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deemed unprotected by the First Amendment in part because they are considered “no
essential part of any exposition of ideas”;30 insults and epithets have been described as
closer to “physical assaults” than to protected expression.31 In Cohen v. California,32
Justice Blackmun protested the Court’s invalidation of Cohen’s conviction for wearing
a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” by dismissing this “absurd and immature
antic” as “mainly conduct and little speech.”33 Justices in the majority in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation34 seemed to regard George Carlin’s monologue on “Seven Filthy
Words” as partaking largely of conduct when, upholding its exclusion from broadcast,
they likened it to a “nuisance”35 and “assault[ ].”36 Variations in this strain of logic were
pressed in Sorrell, Brown, Snyder, Alvarez, and—obliquely—Stevens, failing in each
instance to persuade the Court.
In Sorrell, the Court rebuffed Vermont’s contention that its restrictions on dealing
with physician-specific prescription information did not substantially implicate the Free
Speech Clause.37 Echoing the logic of the First Circuit, which had sustained a similar
law,38 Vermont characterized the sale, transfer, and use of such information as conduct
rather than speech.39 The Court, however, scorned the notion that this information
should be treated as merely a “commodity” with the same First Amendment standing
as “beef jerky.”40 Rather, here as elsewhere, the conveyance of facts formed an integral
part of potentially valuable communication; facts, observed the Court, “are the begin-
ning point for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge
and to conduct human affairs.”41 For the Court, then, speech that facilitated pharmaceu-
tical marketing was undoubtedly “a form of expression protected by the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.”42
In Snyder, the case for regarding Westboro’s picketing as predominantly conduct
was tacitly pressed in Justice Alito’s dissent43 and did not rest on denial of the signs’
30 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
31 See Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L.
REV. 287, 293 (1990).
32 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
33 Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
35 Id. at 750–51 (quoting Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
36 Id. at 759–60 (Powell, J., concurring).
37 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
38 See IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
39 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2666.
40 Id. (quoting Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 52–53) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41 Id. at 2667.
42 Id. at 2659.
43 The argument had been made more explicitly in support of upholding Snyder’s damages
award. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open Texture of
Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 487 (2011) (analogizing the Phelpses’ picketing to their
using signs “as weapons in a physical thrashing and beating of persons on the sidewalk in
Westminster, Maryland”); Brief for the American Legion as Amicus Curiae Supporting
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obvious verbal dimension.44 Instead, Justice Alito’s manner of describing Westboro’s
activity and its effects reflected his belief that the picketing smacked far more of
tortious action than meaningful expression.45 The defendants’ stance on appeal, he
stated, was to “maintain[ ] that the First Amendment gave them a license to engage
in such conduct.”46 While the respondents undoubtedly engaged in expression, Justice
Alito described their communication in terms associated with aggressive physical
behavior.47 The respondents, he asserted, had “brutalize[d]” the father of the slain
soldier with their “vicious verbal assault.”48 When the respondents issued a press re-
lease to announce their intentions, they “began the wounding process”49 that culmi-
nated in their “launch[ing] a malevolent verbal attack” on the soldier’s family.50
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the majority did not dispute that Westboro’s
picketing caused severe emotional injury; the Court acknowledged that the signs had
“inflict[ed] great pain”51 and compounded Snyder’s “incalculable grief.”52 Rather, the
Court’s conclusion flowed from its unshakable premise that the picketing constituted
pure—if revulsive—speech.53 Indeed, the opinion refers to the “speech” involved
dozens of times.54 Thus, the case was governed by the First Amendment’s mandate
“to protect even hurtful speech on public issues.”55
In Brown, California did not argue that violent video games fall wholly outside the
ambit of speech,56 but rather that the visceral experience of immersion in the games
overwhelms their expressive aspect.57 The State claimed that the games exert a harmful
effect absent from more passive media because the player “participates in the violent
action on screen and determines its outcome.”58 Nor was the notion that video games’
Petitioner, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751), 2010 WL 2224730 at *1–2
(asserting that this form of picketing “is ‘a mixture of conduct and communication,’ and thus is
‘qualitatively different from other modes of communication’” (citations omitted)).
44 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
45 Id. (arguing that intentional infliction of emotional distress would be an appropriate cause
of action); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 432 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(describing respondent’s flag burning as part of protest as “an inarticulate grunt or roar” unde-
serving of First Amendment protection).
46 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1223 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
47 See, e.g., id. (“[The] respondents brutally attacked Matthew Snyder.”).
48 Id. at 1222.
49 Id. at 1225.
50 Id. at 1222.
51 Id. at 1220 (majority opinion).
52 Id. at 1218.
53 Id. at 1219.
54 See generally id. (describing the content of respondents’ signs).
55 Id. at 1220. The Court’s designation of the respondents’ speech as addressing a matter
of public concern is discussed at text accompanying notes 85, 92–95 infra.
56 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
57 Id. at 2739.
58 Id. at 2737–38.
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interactivity eclipses their communicative function in minors without support. As
Justice Breyer noted in dissent, studies exist that conclude violent video games pose a
material risk of promoting aggression in minors.59
The majority, however, rejected the notion that playing violent video games is an
activity profoundly distinct from exposure to violence in books, plays, movies, televi-
sion, and other entertainment traditionally available to children.60 For the Court, all
these modes of expression formed an undifferentiated whole in the eyes of the First
Amendment. As Justice Scalia’s opinion bluntly stated, “All literature is interactive.”61
While the Court had recognized a category of unprotected speech obscene as to minors
in Ginsberg v. New York,62 that principle was confined to sexual material.63 Though
obscenity’s unprotected status64 has sometimes been linked to its having a primary ef-
fect outside the realm of communication,65 the Court refused to apply this rationale to
violent narratives.
In Alvarez, as in Snyder, it was Justice Alito in dissent who supplied a basis for as-
cribing the attributes of conduct to the forbidden speech involved.66 To Justice Alito,
Alvarez, through his lie, had “misappropriated” the honor due to those who had earned
the Congressional Medal of Honor.67 Indeed, the Court had precedent for treating
reputation as a possession susceptible to theft. Sustaining a cause of action for libel in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,68 the Court quoted from Shakespeare’s Othello:
“Who steals my purse steals trash; / ’tis something, nothing; / ’Twas mine, ’tis his, and
has been slave to thousands; / But he that filches from me my good name / Robs me
of that which not enriches him, / And makes me poor indeed.”69 Moreover, unlike the
59 See id. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
60 See id. at 2736–38 (majority opinion).
61 Id. at 2738. The Court’s opinion drew from an opinion by Judge Posner for this obser-
vation and further quoted Judge Posner’s elaboration of the proposition. See id. (“Literature
when it is successful draws the reader into the story, makes him identify with the characters,
invites him to judge them and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the
reader’s own.” (quoting Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir.
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (invalidating a similar restriction))).
62 390 U.S. 629, 636–38 (1968).
63 Id. at 638.
64 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 23–24 (1973).
65 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1019 (3d
ed. 2006) (“A third argument often made for excluding obscenity from First Amendment pro-
tection is that it should be regarded as a sex aid, not as speech. Professor Fred Schauer argued
that ‘hardcore pornography is designed to produce a purely physical effect. [It is] essentially
a physical rather than a mental stimulus.’” (citation omitted)).
66 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2565 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
67 Id.
68 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
69 Id. at 12 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3); see also Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 590 (1997) (“Reputation
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defamer who “[r]obs me of that which not enriches him,”70 false claimants of military
honors may not only dilute the value of awards to actual recipients71 but also “enrich”
themselves by reveling in counterfeit glory.
To other Justices, however, it was speech that requires protection from “the
substantial and expansive threats to free expression” when government takes aim at
content.72 While Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion referred to Alvarez’s lie as an
“attempt to steal [ ] honor that belongs to those who fought for this Nation in battle,”73
he would not extend the metaphor of theft to deny this lie the constitutional safeguards
for speech.74 Though the Court had allowed penalties for harmful falsehoods like defa-
mation and fraud under certain conditions, Justice Kennedy concluded, “[F]alsity alone
may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment.”75 Rather, the Stolen
Valor Act’s ban would be subject to ordinary principles governing speech—including
invalidation where counter-speech could accomplish the government’s goal.76
2. Identification of Speech’s Genre
In some instances, protection of secondary speech may hinge on the formal cate-
gory to which what is undoubtedly speech (as opposed to conduct or quasi-conduct)
is assigned. Designation as a disfavored type may relegate the speech to substan-
tially lesser protection or even no protection at all; conversely, a finding that the
speech falls into an alternative category tilts the odds heavily or decisively in favor of
the defendant. One area where choice of characterization looms large is determining
whether an allegedly libelous statement can be reasonably construed as essentially
factual. While the Supreme Court has rejected a “wholesale defamation exemption
for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion,’”77 a ruling that a statement does not as-
sert a provably false fact effectively shields the plaintiff from liability.78 On the other
provides an excellent example of a ‘fundamental’ property interest. Many (if not most) people
would agree that reputation constitutes a precious commodity, a commodity that they expect
the state to protect under its laws.”).
70 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 12 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3).
71 See Brian Schlect, Comment and Note, The New York Times Solution to the Ninth
Circuit’s ‘Stolen Valor’ Problem, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 175, 177–78 (2011).
72 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
73 Id. at 2542.
74 Id. at 2543.
75 Id. at 2545.
76 Id. at 2549–50. The opinion’s determination that counter-speech would suffice here is
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 411–12.
77 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (citation omitted).
78 See, e.g., Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (describ-
ing the Supreme Court’s approach as “examin[ing] the statement’s language and context to
determine if it could be interpreted as asserting a fact”); Tronfeld v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 636 S.E.2d 447, 450 (Va. 2006) (declaring as nonactionable speech “that [which] does
not contain a provably false factual connotation, or statements which cannot reasonably be
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hand, where a form of expression—e.g., obscenity—is categorically proscribable, a
conclusion that the speech at issue falls into that category generally sustains the gov-
ernment’s action.79 The manner in which identification of expression’s character shapes
outcomes is notably at play in two of the cases considered here: Snyder and Stevens.80
Much of the debate in Snyder, both within the Court and among commentators, re-
volved around whether the picketing at Matthew Snyder’s funeral addressed a matter
of public or private concern.81 While the case presented a novel setting for this deter-
mination, this dichotomy had proved pivotal in other areas of expression.82 In defama-
tion doctrine, a private figure seeking presumed or punitive damages over a statement
on a matter of nonpublic concern need not make the showing of actual malice required
where a statement addressing a public concern is involved.83 Similarly, government em-
ployers bear a far lighter burden to dismiss employees over speech found not to pertain
to a public concern.84
interpreted as stating actual facts about a person”); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious
Falsehood § 23 (2005) (describing as not defamatory statements that “cannot reasonably be
interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual”).
79 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 383–84 (1992) (stating that government may not single out particular viewpoints for prohi-
bition even within proscribable categories).
80 A third decision, Sorrell, had potentially hinged on whether to treat the regulated expres-
sion as commercial speech. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983)
(describing factors for determining whether expression is commercial speech); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (setting forth a four-part test
to examine the validity of commercial speech restrictions). However, the Court announced that
the outcome would be the same irrespective of “whether a special commercial speech inquiry or
a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667
(2011). For the Sorrell Court’s application of the Central Hudson test, see id. at 2667–68.
81 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
82 The privileged position of speech on matters of public concern is a major tenet of First
Amendment doctrine. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375–76 (1984)
(stating that communication regarding matters of public importance “is entitled to the most ex-
acting degree of First Amendment protection”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 776 (1978) (holding speech on “matters of public concern” lies “at the heart of the First
Amendment’s protection” (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940))).
83 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
84 Compare Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–87 (1987) (holding that a comment
by a clerical employee expressing approval of an assassination attempt on the President was
insufficient grounds for removal because the remark in context constituted speech on a
matter of public concern), with Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (holding that
the circulation of a questionnaire by an assistant district attorney concerning operation of the
District Attorney’s office was a permissible basis for dismissal where the questionnaire could
not “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community”). The distinction was qualified in Garcetti v. Ceballos. 547 U.S. 410 (2006)
(holding that protection of a public employee’s speech on matters of public concern was
confined to expression as a private citizen rather than performance of official duties).
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Here, too, the Court’s conclusion that the picketing amounted to commentary on
matters of public concern proved central to its ruling that the speech was protected.85
That conclusion was by no means self-evident. Justice Alito was hardly alone in think-
ing that at least some of the signs, viewed in context, did not qualify as expression on
topics of public concern because they “specifically attacked” Matthew Snyder.86 After
all, the respondents had chosen the site of Snyder’s funeral to display placards de-
nouncing the Catholic Church87 and the military,88 and Snyder had belonged to both.89
Moreover, the signs addressed to “you”—“You’re Going to Hell” and “God Hates
You”90—could have been construed as directed at Snyder or his family. Finally, in an
online “epic” posted after the funeral, the picketers had singled out Snyder’s parents
for condemnation for raising him as a Catholic and supporting his participation in
military combat.91
For the majority, however, all of these details were submerged beneath the “overall
thrust and dominant theme”92 of the demonstration. Assessing the “content, form, and
context”93 of Westboro’s picketing, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that church mem-
bers had obviously aimed to air their views on matters of public importance: “the
political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation,
homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy.”94 That
the respondents had sought to amplify their message by synchronizing their activity
with Matthew Snyder’s funeral did not detract from the overriding fact that they had
“addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full
compliance with the guidance of local officials.”95
85 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (“Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place
on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the
First Amendment.”).
86 Id. at 1226–27 (Alito, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Essay, Content Neutrality
and Compelling Interests: The October 2010 Term, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 14, 21–22 (2012);
Jeffrey Shulman, Epic Considerations: The Speech that the Supreme Court Would Not Hear
in Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 35, 40–41; see also Zipursky, supra note
43, at 507–08 (asserting that Snyder had a viable claim of infliction of emotional distress avail-
able to those subjected to emotional harm while grieving the loss of a loved one).
87 Two of the signs read “Pope in Hell” and “Priests Rape Boys.” Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217.
88 Examples include “Thank God for IEDs” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.” Id.
at 1216–17.
89 See id. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Alito argued that the anti-
homosexual theme of several of the placards would have been reasonably perceived as falsely
suggesting that Matthew was gay. Id. at 1225.
90 Id. at 1213 (majority opinion).
91 See id. at 1225–26 (Alito, J., dissenting). The “epic” was not considered by the Court.
92 Id. at 1217 (majority opinion).
93 Id. at 1216 (citation omitted).
94 Id. at 1217.
95 Id. at 1220; see also Paul E. Salamanca, Snyder v. Phelps: A Hard Case That Did Not
Make Bad Law, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 57, 67 (“Human beings are social beings, and much
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While the Snyder Court’s designation of Westboro’s speech as directed to public
issues assured its protection, it was the Court’s rejection of a classification urged by
the government that determined the outcome in Stevens. Though Stevens was convicted
for selling videos of pit bulls engaging in dogfights and attacking other animals,96
the federal ban on depictions of animal cruelty had been animated by what many
would regard as an even more disturbing phenomenon: “crush videos.”97 Appealing
to a distinctive sexual fetish, crush videos typically showed women slowly crushing
helpless animals to death with their feet or high-heeled shoes.98 Obviously, the tor-
ture of these animals occurred for the purpose of recording the act and disseminating
the resulting videos.99 Moreover, even with dogfighting videos, it seems reasonable
to assume that the prospect of selling such videos had stimulated at least a significant
portion of the activity depicted in them.100 Thus, the government had grounds for con-
tending that crush videos and depictions of animal fighting are “intrinsically related
to criminal conduct”101—a category of expression that the Court acknowledged is not
protected by the First Amendment.102
The Stevens majority, however, bypassed the question of whether legislation aimed
specifically at these types of depictions would survive constitutional scrutiny.103 For the
Court, the “alarming breadth” of the statute rendered it facially invalid.104 By appearing
to encompass depictions of activities such as hunting that are legal in some jurisdictions
and illegal in others, the statute swept within its prohibitions a wide swath of protected
speech.105 Adopting this construction, the Court found implausible the notion that the
expression criminalized by the statute was categorically related to criminal conduct.106
of what they do is bound up with matters of public concern. Mere ‘relation to’ another person,
without more, should not exclude speech on a matter of public concern from protection.”).
96 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1583 (2010).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See id. at 1599 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[Crush] videos record the commission of violent
criminal acts, and it appears that these crimes are committed for the sole purpose of creating
the videos.”).
100 See Abigail Lauren Perdue, When Bad Things Happen to Good Laws: The Rise, Fall, and
Future of Section 48, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 469, 522 (2011) (endorsing the view that in
some cases of dogfighting videos, “the cruelty would never have occurred but for the creation
and sale of the film”).
101 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
102 Id. at 1584 (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)).
103 Id. at 1592 (“We . . . do not decide whether a statute limited to crush videos or other de-
pictions of extreme animal cruelty would be constitutional.”).
104 Id. at 1588.
105 Id. at 1588–90. In banning the creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty
for commercial gain, the statute applied to depictions “in which a living animal is intentionally
maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed,” if the conduct depicted violated federal or state
law where “the creation, sale, or possession takes place.” 18 U.S.C. § 48(c)(1) (2006). The
Court’s overbreadth analysis is further discussed infra at Part II.A.
106 The government has well conceded that this rationale collapsed under the Court’s inter-
pretation of the statute’s reach. See Stevens, 131 S. Ct. at 1592.
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B. Relevant Classification of Restriction
Another source of dispute sometimes posed by restrictions on secondary speech is
over-classification of the restriction itself. As a practical matter, judicial characterization
of the nature of regulation of expression frequently determines its validity. For example,
a conclusion that public property constitutes a public forum typically confers access to
the speaker seeking to engage in expressive activity there,107 while designation as a non-
public forum almost invariably leads to exclusion.108 Even more starkly dispositive is
resolution of the question of state action; determination that a privately imposed restric-
tion cannot be ascribed to the state eliminates First Amendment scrutiny altogether.109
Perhaps nowhere is this dynamic more prominent than disputes over whether a par-
ticular limitation on speech is essentially aimed at its content. And nowhere was this de-
bate more notably joined among the Court’s recent decisions on secondary speech than
in Sorrell. The case arose against a backdrop of frequent Court pronouncements on the
dangers and presumed invalidity of content-based restrictions on expression.110 On the
107 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995);
Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98–99 (1972); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v.
Perry Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (describing the burden on government to
justify exclusion from a public forum).
108 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680, 683 (1998);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808–09 (1985); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837–38 (1976); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 (“In addition
to time, place, and manner regulations, the state may reserve the [nonpublic] forum for its in-
tended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view.”). See generally Lillian R. Bevier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of
Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79 (considering the current framework of the public forum doc-
trine and proposing a structured, risk-correlated approach).
109 Compare, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (finding a First Amendment right
to distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town), with Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (rejecting a First Amendment right to conduct labor picketing at a
shopping center). Similarly, in the realm of compelled expression, objections to mandatory
charges to producers to fund generic advertising messages can gain no First Amendment traction
when the advertisements are deemed government speech. Compare United States v. United
Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (sustaining a mushroom producer’s objection to compelled as-
sessment spent mostly on generic advertising of mushrooms), with Johanns v. Livestock Mktg.
Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005) (rejecting beef producers’ challenge to tax on sales and imports
of cattle to fund a promotional campaign for beef where content of the advertising was “effec-
tively controlled by the Federal Government itself”).
110 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768, 781 (2002) (invalidat-
ing a law prohibiting a candidate for judicial election from announcing “his or her views on
disputed legal or political issues” where the State failed to meet “the burden imposed by our
strict-scrutiny test to establish this proposition (that campaign statements are uniquely destructive
of open-mindedness) on which the validity of the announce clause rests”); United States v.
Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000) (striking down limitations on the telecast
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other hand, the Court has applied less stringent scrutiny to content-neutral regulations
of the “time, place, and manner”111 of expression,112 and to content-based restrictions
of speech seeking to address the “secondary effects” of that speech.113 Thus, outcomes
can hinge on the sometimes debatable question of whether suppression of certain con-
tent for its own sake is the salient feature of a challenged restriction.114
In Sorrell, that debate came in the form of a longstanding difference over the proper
paradigm for assessing regulation of commercial speech.115 The debate began at the
dawn of the Court’s modern commercial speech doctrine in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.116 In striking down a state’s ban
on advertising prescription drug prices, the Court announced that restrictions on com-
mercial speech would be largely governed by normal First Amendment principles.117
Fundamentally disturbing was that the statute “singles out speech of a particular con-
tent and seeks to prevent its dissemination completely.”118 The state had asserted several
potential adverse consequences from advertising, including the prospect of consumers
flocking to cheaper but less professional pharmacists.119 Though approving latitude for
measures to assure commercial speech’s accuracy,120 the Court refused to countenance
a ban premised on the “advantages of [citizens] being kept in ignorance.”121 Four years
later in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission,122
of sexually explicit programming under strict scrutiny where the government “failed to show
that [the statute] is the least restrictive means for addressing a real problem”); Turner Broad.
Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (observing that regulations aimed at content of speech
“pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal,
but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion
rather than persuasion”); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (describing the rationale for presumed invalidity of content dis-
crimination as its “rais[ing] the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas
or viewpoints from the marketplace”); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,
383–84 (1984) (invalidating a statute prohibiting any noncommercial station that receives a
grant from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to “engage in editorializing”).
111 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 676 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 642.
113 See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1986) (sustaining
a zoning restriction targeting adult theaters because of its content-neutral purpose of curbing the
non-speech-related “secondary effects” of such theaters).
114 See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 242 (2012)
(“Perhaps the biggest difficulty with content discrimination is that ‘content’ is hardly self-
defining.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 83 (1978).
115 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2012).
116 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
117 Id. at 770.
118 Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
119 Id. at 768.
120 See id. at 771–72 n.24.
121 Id. at 769.
122 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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the Court similarly took note that “[i]n most other contexts, the First Amendment pro-
hibits regulation based on the content of the message.”123 While again acknowledging
that distinctive aspects of commercial speech allowed for some regulation of content,124
the general presumption against content-based restrictions rather than its exceptions
governed the case.125 The Court struck down a ban on all advertising by electric utilities
to promote the use of electricity because it failed the requirement that regulation not be
“more extensive than is necessary to serve [the state’s] interest.”126
For Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in both Virginia Board and Central Hudson,
the Court’s entire approach to restrictions on commercial speech in these cases was fun-
damentally misconceived.127 The crucial feature of the regulations at issue was not that
they were aimed at the content of speech, but that they formed part of a larger regula-
tory scheme designed to further important state interests.128 In Virginia Board, Justice
Rehnquist objected to “elevat[ing] commercial intercourse between a seller hawking his
wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain to the same plane as has been previously
reserved for the free marketplace of ideas . . . ”129 and suggested that the Court had re-
turned to the Lochner130 era’s judicial intrusion into social and economic policy.131
Likewise in Central Hudson, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Commission’s order
was “more akin to an economic regulation to which virtually complete deference
should be accorded by this Court”132 and again accused the majority of moving toward
the revival of Lochnerism.133
123 Id. at 564 n.6.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 570.
126 Id. at 566, 570–71 (finding that the Commission had “not demonstrated that its interest in
conservation cannot be protected adequately by more limited regulation,” including a require-
ment that advertisements include information about efficiency and the expense of services).
127 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 583–606 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781–89 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
128 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 599–602 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Va. State Bd., 425
U.S. at 790 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129 Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
131 See Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts do not substi-
tute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies who are elected to
pass laws.” (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979) (“[E]conomic due process is
resurrected [in Virginia Board], clothed in the ill-fitting garb of the first amendment [sic] . . . .”);
Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583,
2586 (2008). For an overview of the Lochner era, see Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383
(2001); Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due
Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751 (2009).
132 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 591.
133 See id.
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Though the framework announced in Central Hudson continued as the standard for
reviewing commercial speech regulation,134 Sorrell evoked renewed argument that
some regulation impinging on commercial speech—especially in the field of health135—
should be judged by standards for commercial regulatory schemes rather than doctrines
governing political and other “core” expression.136 For Justice Breyer, the First Amend-
ment’s solicitude for the “maintenance of a free marketplace for goods and services”137
was markedly less than that for the marketplace of ideas for “social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences.”138 Invoking a classic statement of the Court’s
permissive philosophy in this area, he observed that “regulatory legislation affecting
ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional” if it is based
on “some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”139
Thus, the skepticism toward content-based and speaker-based restrictions appropriate
to the realm of ideas was profoundly misplaced in a commercial regulatory regime
whose impact on speech was “indirect, incidental, and entirely commercial.”140 Like
Justice Rehnquist earlier, Justice Breyer feared that the decision threatened a return to
the Lochner era’s judicial usurpation of legislative prerogative in economic policy.141
For the Sorrell majority, however, the First Amendment’s skepticism toward re-
strictions aimed at particular content transcended commercial boundaries.142 What was
134 See, e.g., Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002); Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001).
135 In a sense, the debate and outcome in Sorrell were foreshadowed nearly a decade earlier
in Thompson, a case that also involved health care policy. 535 U.S. at 360. Thompson invalidated
a federal law allowing pharmacists to dispense compounded drugs tailored to particular patients
only if they did not advertise or solicit prescriptions for the compounding of a specific drug or
type of drug. Id. The law regarded advertising as reflecting a scale of operation that warranted
activation of extensive testing procedures from which small-scale compounding was otherwise
exempt. Id. at 368–70. The Court held that this restriction failed to meet Central Hudson’s fourth
requirement that restrictions on commercial speech be no more extensive than necessary because
the government had failed to demonstrate that its aim could not be achieved through other
methods that did not inhibit speech: e.g., limiting the amount of particular compounded drugs
that pharmacists could sell in a certain period. Id. at 371–73. Invoking Virginia Board, the ma-
jority rejected the four dissenters’ contention that the restriction advanced the government’s
interest in curbing the sale of compounded drugs to “patients who may not clearly need them.”
Id. at 373 (referring to Justice Breyer’s dissent). In both cases, the First Amendment forbade
measures “preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent
members of the public from making bad decisions with the information.” Id. at 374–75.
136 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2673–74 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 2674.
138 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139 Id. at 2675 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140 Id. at 2685.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 2664. For the view that the Court’s post–New Deal distinction between economic
and non-economic liberty should be abandoned, see Ernest A. Young, Sorrell v. IMS Health and
the End of the Constitutional Double Standard, 36 VT. L. REV. 903 (2012).
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crucial was not that the ban sought to implement an otherwise legitimate commercial
program but that it did so by tendentiously suppressing certain speech.143 The law
sought to prevent marketing representatives of pharmaceutical manufacturers, known
as “detailers,” from utilizing their knowledge of individual prescribing practices when
visiting physicians.144 However, the bar against communication and exploitation of this
information was selective; the information could be “purchased or acquired by other
speakers with diverse purposes and viewpoints”—e.g., academic organizations seeking
to counter the promotion of brand-name pharmaceutical drugs.145 To the Court,
Vermont had attempted to stack the deck in a debate of public import; legislative
findings supporting the law revealed that its “express purpose and practical effect are
to diminish the effectiveness of marketing by manufacturers of brand-name drugs.”146
Accordingly, the law imposed both a “content-based” and “speaker-based” burden on
speech.147 Such a law triggered “heightened” scrutiny;148 predictably, the Court deter-
mined that “[t]he law cannot satisfy that standard.”149 Ultimately, then, the outcome was
governed by the logic of central First Amendment principles rather than by the com-
mercial setting in which they operated: “If pharmaceutical marketing affects treatment
decisions, it does so because doctors find it persuasive. Absent circumstances far from
those presented here, the fear that speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for
quieting it.”150
C. Defining an Issue by Government Interest: The Case of Minors
A different sense of what a case is “about” that can shape outcomes rests on judicial
perception of the interest that is fundamentally implicated in the case. For example, a
belief that what is centrally at stake is the government’s capacity to preserve na-
tional security can override assertions of rights that might well be sustained in other
contexts.151 While restrictions ascribed to national security do not invariably prevail,152
assessing them through this framework tilts heavily in the government’s favor.
A similar duality pervades cases involving government efforts to withhold from
children the full measure of rights enjoyed by adults. On the one hand, the Supreme
143 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
144 See id. at 2661.
145 Id. at 2663.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 2667.
149 Id. at 2659.
150 Id. at 2670.
151 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728–30 (2010);
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242–43 (1984); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306–08 (1981);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1965).
152 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533–35 (2004); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 520–23 (1985); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718–19 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring).
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Court has not formulated a cohesive “law of minors.” On the other hand, a distinct
strain in the Court’s jurisprudence has sustained limitations on rights whose rationale
has been largely cast as the protection of children.153 While government attempts to
characterize such regulation as needed safeguards for minors do not invariably pre-
vail,154 such efforts on the whole have enjoyed a large measure of success.155 Against
this backdrop, it is noteworthy that two of the Court’s recent decisions on secondary
speech—Brown and (to a less prominent degree) Fox—rejected speech restrictions
based on sweeping assumptions about youth.156
1. Minors’ Subordinate Status Under the Bill of Rights
Modification of rights stemming from the distinctive nature of youth has been up-
held across a range of settings. One of the most conspicuous of these is schools. Not-
withstanding the Court’s famous pronouncement that students in public schools do not
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate,”157 in recent decades they have seen their rights repeatedly shrunk when crossing
that threshold. In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,158 the Court sustained a public high school’s
deletion from a student newspaper of an article describing one student’s experiences
with pregnancy and another discussing the effect of divorce on students at the school.159
Since the newspaper was published by students in a journalism class, the deletion fell
within educators’ authority to “exercis[e] editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities”160 to the extent such control
is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”161 Here, school officials
were entitled to shield student readers from material thought inappropriate to their level
of emotional maturity.162 A similar solicitude for youthful sensibilities shaped the out-
come in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,163 where the Court sustained disci-
plinary action against a high school student for a nomination speech for school office
153 See infra notes 157–214 and accompanying text.
154 See infra notes 215–27 and accompanying text.
155 For an argument that children’s speech should be determined by a graduated scale of ex-
pressive maturity, see Jonathan David Shaub, Children’s Freedom of Speech and Expressive
Maturity, 36 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 191, 229–38 (2012).
156 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012); Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2727 (2011).
157 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Tinker is dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying note 217.
158 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
159 Id. at 274–76.
160 Id. at 273.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 274–76.
163 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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laced with thinly veiled double entendres.164 In order to avert harm to a “less mature
audience,”165 schools may forbid “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech”166 like that en-
gaged in by this “confused boy.”167 In Morse v. Frederick,168 the Court confirmed that
educators’ authority over student speech is not confined to the physical premises of
school.169 At an off-campus event sanctioned and supervised by the school, students
displayed a banner saying “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”170 The Morse Court sustained con-
fiscation of the banner and Frederick’s suspension on the ground that schools may
“safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as
encouraging illegal drug use.”171
Nor is free speech the only guarantee of the Bill of Rights whose strictures have
been relaxed at public schools; the Fourth Amendment and procedural due process ap-
ply with less rigor there as well. In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,172 the Court ruled that teachers
and school officials need not have probable cause in order to conduct a search.173
Rather, they can search a student “when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either
the law or the rules of the school.”174 This relatively low threshold, explained the Court,
comports with schools’ need for flexibility in disciplinary procedures and the “value of
preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship.”175 Elaborating on the be-
nign premise of this latter consideration, Justice Powell’s concurrence pointed to the
“special relationship”176 between teacher and student in which a “commonality of inter-
ests” generally prevails.177 A decade later, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,178
the Court expanded school authorities’ exemption from ordinary Fourth Amendment
requirements when it upheld a school’s policy of random urinalysis drug testing of stu-
dents participating in its athletic programs.179 There, the Court frankly embraced the no-
tion that public schools constitute a zone of sharply diminished Fourth Amendment
164 See Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985); see also
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78 (describing Fraser as having “referred to his candidate in terms of
an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor”).
165 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
169 Id. at 400–01.
170 Id. at 396, 397.
171 Id. at 397.
172 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
173 Id. at 341.
174 Id. at 341–42.
175 Id. at 340.
176 Id. at 349.
177 Id. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring).
178 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
179 Id. at 656–57.
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rights.180 These rights “are different in public schools than elsewhere” because the rea-
sonableness of a search “cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsi-
bility for children.”181 Subsequently, in Board of Education of Independent School
District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,182 the Court extended this rationale
and latitude to encompass an “entirely reasonable”183 policy of compelling all students
who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing.184
With respect to due process, the school environment has justified swift and severe
discipline with a minimum of procedure. This principle was dramatically illustrated in
Ingraham v. Wright,185 where the Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to paddling of students in public
schools and that the availability of common-law remedies for excessive paddling sat-
isfied procedural due process.186 The Court was satisfied that “[t]he openness of the
public school and its supervision by the community” offered adequate safeguards
against potential abuse.187 Additionally, the Court found scant risk of unjustified pad-
dling when summary discipline is meted out because “paddlings are usually inflicted
in response to conduct directly observed by teachers in their presence . . . .”188
In the justice system and other modes of potential confinement as well, the consti-
tutionally compelled process has been streamlined for minors. The Court, in McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania,189 held that juveniles involved in juvenile court adjudicative proceed-
ings to determine their delinquency are not entitled to trial by jury.190 Writing for a plu-
rality, Justice Blackmun credited authorities at juvenile proceedings with benevolent
intentions that counseled against “remak[ing] the juvenile proceeding into a fully adver-
sary process and . . . put[ting] an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect
of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.”191 The safeguards offered by juries did
not match the benefits “of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention
that the juvenile court system contemplates.”192 In Schall v. Martin,193 the Court ap-
proved pretrial detention of accused juvenile delinquents found to present a “serious
risk” that, before their return date, they would commit what would constitute criminal
180 Id.
181 Id. at 656.
182 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
183 Id. at 836.
184 Id. at 836–38.
185 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
186 Id. at 683.
187 Id. at 670.
188 Id. at 677–78; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (“Events calling for disci-
pline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action.”).
189 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
190 Id. at 545 (plurality opinion).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 550.
193 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
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acts but for their juvenile status.194 The normal bar against pretrial detention could
be waived because of minors’ diminished liberty interest and capacity; juveniles “are
always in some form of custody,”195 and “by definition, are not assumed to have the
capacity to take care of themselves.”196 A similar attitude toward minors, coupled with
generous assumptions about parental authority and intent, informed the Court’s deci-
sion in Parham v. J.R.197 There, the Court upheld procedures under which parents could
commit their children to a mental hospital without a pre-admission adversary proceed-
ing as long as the decision was approved by a “neutral factfinder.”198 The Court found
assurance against erroneous commitment in the “natural bonds of affection [that] lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children.”199
Moreover, the Court has sometimes adjusted rights already limited as to adults
to further restrict their scope for minors. For adult women, the Court has reviewed
regulation of abortion under an “undue burden” standard,200 sustaining some measures
that potentially hamper women’s access to abortion201 but invalidating those—e.g., a
spousal notification provision—thought to place a “substantial obstacle” in the way
of women seeking abortions.202 At the same time, the Court has allowed states to re-
quire parental consent for dependent, immature minors seeking abortions, unless such
a minor can persuade a court either that she is mature or that an abortion would be in
her best interest.203 Similarly, while the Court has approved suppression of materials
meeting the constitutional criteria for obscenity,204 it has permitted states to forbid the
sale to minors of sexually oriented content that would not be obscene as to adults.205
Society’s “transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children,” the Court stated,
justified calibration of the meaning of obscenity for youth.206
Finally, the government’s authority to “adjust its legal system to account for chil-
dren’s vulnerability”207 has included restraints on adults’ expression deemed to risk the
194 Id. at 255–57.
195 Id. at 265.
196 Id.
197 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
198 Id. at 606 (citation omitted).
199 Id. at 602.
200 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–79 (1992) (O’Connor,
Kennedy & Souter, JJ., joint opinion).
201 See id. at 885–86 (upholding a twenty-four hour waiting period).
202 See id. at 897–98 (opinion of Court).
203 See id. at 899–900 (upholding a one-parent consent requirement with a judicial bypass
alternative for unemancipated women under eighteen).
204 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973).
205 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634–37 (1968).
206 Id. at 640 (quoting People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 312 (1965) (Fuld, J., concurring));
see also Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“[T]here is a compel-
ling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well being of minors . . . [that] extends
to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.”).
207 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
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well-being of minors. Perhaps the most compelling application of this rationale oc-
curred in New York v. Ferber,208 where the Court upheld a statute prohibiting the
knowing promotion of a sexual performance by a child under the age of sixteen by dis-
tributing material depicting such a performance.209 The Court accepted the legislative
judgment that “the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to
the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.”210 To a lesser but note-
worthy extent, the sensibilities of children also informed the Court’s unanimous
decision in Rowan v. Post Office Department211 to uphold a statute “whereby any
householder may insulate himself from advertisements that offer for sale ‘matter which
the addressee in his sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually pro-
vocative.’”212 While resting mainly on the principle that “a mailer’s right to communi-
cate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee,”213 the Court also endorsed
Congress’s support for householders seeking to avoid the risk that their children be ex-
posed to offensive material.214
Of course, the Court has not invariably ruled against the assertion of minors’ consti-
tutional rights. Recognizing that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State”215
even in public schools, the Court struck down a requirement that public school pupils
salute the flag while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance216 and the suspension of public
school students for wearing black armbands as a symbolic protest against American
prosecution of the Vietnam War.217 Likewise, minors retain a significant core of proce-
dural rights when threatened with confinement for alleged misconduct. Under the
Court’s ruling in In re Gault,218 the procedural guarantees of notice of charges, right
to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and right of confrontation and cross-
examination protect minors in proceedings to determine delinquency when confine-
ment may result.219 In addition, when a minor in juvenile proceedings is charged with
conduct that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the State must es-
tablish proof beyond a reasonable doubt.220 Moreover, while the Court has qualified
208 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
209 Id. at 774.
210 Id. at 758.
211 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
212 Id. at 730 (citation omitted).
213 Id. at 736–37.
214 Id. at 738.
215 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (invalidating a requirement that all
parents send their children to public schools).
216 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (acknowledging children’s
“right of self-determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude”).
217 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969).
218 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
219 See id. at 1–3.
220 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 365 (2009) (ruling that a school official’s reasonable suspicion that a
student was distributing contraband drugs did not justify a strip search).
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minors’ rights to abortion,221 it has struck down a statute prohibiting the sale or distri-
bution of contraceptives to minors under sixteen.222 And in recent decisions, the Court
has even looked to youths’ lack of fully developed capacity as grounds for mitigating
the constitutionally permissible penalty for certain criminal conduct.223
Nor has the Court reflexively upheld restrictions on expression suitable for adults
in order to avoid their availability to impressionable youth. Especially in the realm of
more advanced technologies, the Court has invalidated wholesale bans on classes of
sexually oriented material designed to prevent access by minors.224 Thus, the Court
struck down portions of a federal statute forbidding the transmission of “indecent” or
“patently offensive” communications by means of telecommunications devices,225 as
well as a ban on virtual child pornography.226 In addition, the Court disapproved a fed-
eral requirement that cable operators either scramble sexually explicit channels or limit
programming on such channels to certain hours because the government had failed to
show that less-restrictive means would not serve its interest of enabling parents to
shield their children from this type of material.227
2. Brown and Fox: Free Speech over Generalizations About Children as
Central Framework
The Court in Brown and Fox thus had ample precedent on which to draw to uphold
the restrictions there as falling within the sphere of governmental power to address dan-
gers attendant to youth. That the Court instead ignored this body of jurisprudence to
sustain the challenges in these cases underscores the depth of its commitment to free
speech tenets. Especially in Brown, where this debate came to the forefront, the Court
pointedly declined a plausible opportunity to situate the case within the extensive line
of decisions premised on the peculiar status of minors.
The appeal of casting Brown in terms of presumptions about children is reflected
by the failure of Justice Scalia’s opinion to command more than a bare majority of the
221 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
222 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
223 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding that a mandatory sentence
of life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates the
Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–29 (2010) (ruling that a sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juveniles who did not commit homicide
violates the Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–71 (2005) (invalidating
as violative of the Eighth Amendment the application of the death penalty to juvenile conduct).
224 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
225 Id. at 864–65; see also Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124–31
(1989) (invalidating a federal prohibition of adult access to telephone messages that were
“indecent” but not obscene).
226 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
227 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–15 (2000).
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Court.228 Justice Breyer’s dissent was particularly blunt in charging the Court with
having misclassified the dominant aspect of the case.229 For him, the pertinent First
Amendment category was not “depictions of violence”230 but rather “the category of
‘protection of children.’”231 Justice Breyer found Ginsberg particularly instructive,
and its acknowledgement of states’ power to enact “laws designed to aid discharge
of [parental] responsibility”232 and promote their “interest in the well-being of [their]
youth” controlling.233 He believed that California had furnished sufficient data to dem-
onstrate that the measure served these interests234 as well as its separate aim of pro-
tecting potential victims of video-inspired violence.235 Indeed, for Justice Breyer, the
Court’s ruling left “a serious anomaly”236 in which states could ban depictions of nudity
but not interactive depictions of extreme violence.237
Justice Alito, too, whose concurrence on vagueness grounds was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts,238 endorsed state authority to cope with “the effect of exceptionally vio-
lent video games on impressionable minors.”239 For minors, he believed, “the experi-
ence of playing a video game may be quite different from the experience of reading a
book, listening to a radio broadcast, or viewing a movie.”240 Justice Alito expressed
particular concern that evolving technology would soon develop games that “allow
troubled teens to experience in an extraordinarily personal and vivid way what it would
be like to carry out unspeakable acts of violence.”241 Accordingly, he wished to reserve
the possibility that a properly crafted statute would pass constitutional muster.242
The majority opinion’s sweeping language, however, rendered such a prospect un-
likely. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia cast the issue presented in stark constitu-
tional terms. He readily conceded California’s prerogative to believe that violent video
228 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732 (2011).
229 Id. at 2761–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
230 Id. at 2762 (quoting Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231 Id.
232 Id. at 2767 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639–40 (1968)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
233 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
234 See Schauer, supra note 14, at 108 (“[I]f the claim [in Brown] is . . . about the safety of
those who become the victims of media-inspired juvenile violence, then arguments focused on
and deflecting the concern to the importance of parental control are largely beside the point.”).
235 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2766–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
236 Id. at 2771.
237 Id. Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the original intent of the First
Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech did not encompass a right to communicate with
a minor without going through the minor’s parents or guardians. See id. at 2751–61 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
238 Id. at 2742–46 (Alito, J., concurring).
239 Id. at 2742.
240 Id. at 2751.
241 Id. at 2750.
242 See id. at 2751.
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games “corrupt the young or harm their moral development.”243 The Court’s own pre-
rogative and duty, however, was to determine whether this content-based restriction of
speech that fell outside traditionally unprotected categories of expression244 met strict
scrutiny.245 It was the imperatives of the First Amendment, not the state’s asserted pro-
tection of children, that would define that duty: “Even where the protection of children
is the object, the constitutional limits on governmental action apply.”246 In thus refusing
to defer to legislative judgment about the welfare of minors, the Court echoed its earlier
insistence in Barnette that the state’s power to formulate policy concerning children did
not warrant abdication of judicial duty: “[W]e act in these matters not by authority of
our competence but by force of our commissions. We cannot, because of modest esti-
mates of our competence in such specialties as public education, withhold the judgment
that history authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is infringed.”247
Given a choice between adhering to its frequent willingness to qualify minors’ rights
or to its stated recognition of minors’ presumptive freedom of speech, the Court
opted decisively for the latter: “[M]inors are entitled to a significant measure of First
Amendment protection, and only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances
may government bar public dissemination of protected materials to them.”248
In Fox, by contrast, the Court’s reliance on vagueness grounds to invalidate the
FCC’s enforcement actions249 skirted the question of whether the government’s interest
in protecting children could justify the Commission’s indecency policy.250 Nevertheless,
it is telling that the government’s own reliance on its power to shield minors from inap-
propriate material proved unavailing. The FCC sought to locate its actions within the
Court’s earlier recognition of government’s “interest in protecting minors from ex-
posure to vulgar and offensive spoken language,”251 and from comparably harmful
images.252 Believing that this interest justified lowered scrutiny, the Commission
243 Id. at 2741 (majority opinion).
244 See id. at 2733–38; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
245 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738.
246 Id. at 2741.
247 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
248 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735–36 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212–13
(1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
249 See Fox v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2316–20; see also infra notes
301–07 and accompanying text.
250 See Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2320 (noting that the Court was not ruling on the validity of the
FCC’s indecency policy under the First Amendment).
251 Brief for Petitioners at 41, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012)
(No. 10-1293), 2011 WL 3947560, at *41 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners] (quoting Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
252 Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631–32, 637–43 (1968)); id. at 23 (“The
Commission’s indecency-enforcement rules remain a reasonable and constitutional implemen-
tation of the government’s compelling interest in protecting children from harmful exposure to
sexual or excretory words and images.”); see also Brief of Amici Curiae of Judith A. Reisman,
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pointed to Ginsburg’s approval of a rationale for restriction that did not claim empirical
rigor.253 In addition, the Commission specifically sought to deflect concerns about ade-
quate notice by asserting that Fox must have realized that the “gratuitous broadcast of
the F-Word and the S-Word, during primetime awards shows with millions of children
in the audience,” would have been considered indecent.254 As in Brown, however, the
Court refused to waive fundamental constitutional safeguards simply because the gov-
ernment wished to frame the issue as a matter of protecting children.255
II. CHOOSING THE POTENT FORM OF VARIABLE DOCTRINES:
OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS
Constitutional outcomes may rest largely on whether to apply the “strong” or
“weak” version of a formal doctrine. A recurring example is the Court’s pronouncement
in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley256 that “above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”257 The Court has repeatedly invoked this
sweeping formulation of the First Amendment’s bar against discriminatory regulation
to invalidate selective restrictions of speech.258 At the same time, the Court has often
sustained laws that might well fail a vigorous application of this principle.259 A similar
duality pervades the operation of the overlapping doctrines of overbreadth and vague-
ness.260 As noted below, the Court has exercised both alacrity in facially invalidating
Ph.D. & Liberty Counsel in Support of Petitioners at 20–21, FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293), 2011 WL 4352233, at *20–21 (arguing that the re-
striction should be upheld as “a narrowly tailored means of achieving the state’s ends of protect-
ing young people from indecent language, images and collateral ideations”).
253 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 251, at 38 (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641 (“In up-
holding regulation of indecent material in the interest of protecting children, this Court has not
required ‘scientific’ proof that dissemination of the materials to minors would actually have the
feared effect.”)).
254 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
255 Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2319 (acknowledging that the government imposed sanctions on Fox
for failing to protect children from exposure to “the indecent material broadcast”).
256 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
257 Id. at 95.
258 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 n.4 (1992); Ark. Writers’ Project,
Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
530, 537 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975).
259 See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 601 (1998) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 208 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); S.F. Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 571 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 58 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
260 See Joe Bant, United States v. Rosen: Pushing the Free Press Onto a Slippery Slope?,
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1027, 1039–40 (2007); Thomas Regnier, “Civilizing” Drug Paraphernalia
Policy: Preserving Our Free Speech and Due Process Rights While Protecting Children, 14
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 129 (2011).
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statutes on one of these grounds and reluctance to strike down an entire law because it
suffers from one of these defects. In recent cases of secondary speech where an over-
breadth or vagueness challenge was mounted, however, the Court routinely applied the
more robust version of these doctrines.
A. Overbreadth Doctrine as Sword
Overbreadth doctrine holds that “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a sub-
stantial amount of protected speech.”261 Thus, laws that banned “opprobrious words
or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace”;262 forbade charitable
organizations from allocating to expenses more than twenty-five percent of money pro-
duced by fundraising activity;263 and prohibited drive-in movie theaters from dis-
playing films containing nudity when the screen is visible from a public place264
have been ruled invalid for their excessive facial encroachment on protected expres-
sion. However, another powerful thread has also run through the Court’s overbreadth
jurisprudence: the warning that wholesale invalidation under this doctrine when the
challenging party’s own expression or conduct is unprotected is “strong medicine”265
to be employed “sparingly and only as a last resort.”266 Under this philosophy, the Court
has refused to facially strike down laws forbidding (with limited exceptions) possession
or viewing of any material or performance showing a minor who was not one’s child
in a state of nudity,267 barring only commercial users’ access to the addresses of arrested
individuals,268 and prohibiting discrimination by any “place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement”269 based on race, creed, sex, and other specified grounds unless
the discriminating entity was “in its nature distinctly private.”270 In Stevens, Brown,
and Alvarez, though, the Court put aside any qualms about applying this medicine and
facially invalidated statutes for the breadth of expression that they reached.
The Court’s emphatic application of overbreadth principles to strike down the stat-
ute in Stevens was especially striking, since plausible grounds existed by which the
Court could have construed the ban on depictions of animal cruelty to constrain its lit-
eral “alarming breadth.”271 Addressing the statute’s potential for trenching on a large
swathe of protected expression, the statute exempted videos with “serious religious,
261 United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1838 (2008).
262 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 (1972).
263 See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
264 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
265 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
266 Id.
267 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112–14 (1990).
268 See L.A. Police Dept. v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39–40 (1999).
269 N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 4 (1988).
270 Id. at 5.
271 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010); see also supra note 104 and
accompanying text.
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political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.”272 Moreover,
the Court seemed to imply that a ban on depictions of crush videos—which record an
exceptionally abhorrent activity273—or “other depictions of extreme animal cruelty”
might withstand constitutional scrutiny.274 Accordingly, the Court might have applied
one of the long-established “Ashwander rules”275 calling for statutes to be interpreted
where possible to render them constitutional to ascribe to the act a permissible scope.276
The Court, however, firmly rejected the government’s contention that the statute’s
reach could be confined to crush videos and depictions of animal fighting.277 Dissecting
the actual language of the statute, the Court noted that its prohibitions extended to de-
pictions of conduct that was illegal but arguably not cruel and of conduct, such as hunt-
ing, that was illegal in a single jurisdiction.278 Nor did the statute’s exceptions clause
salvage its validity by sufficiently narrowing the range of applications; again turning
to depictions of hunting to illustrate the statute’s flaws, the Court asserted that hunting
videos would generally not qualify for an exception.279 Thus construed, the statute fell
afoul of the principle that a First Amendment facial challenge to legislation will be sus-
tained where “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”280
In Brown, the Court’s reliance on overbreadth worked in conjunction with the de-
fect of underinclusiveness to whipsaw the state’s effort at regulation into an untenable
position. While California’s statute was defended in part as a means of aiding parents
who disapproved of violent video games, its restriction applied to minors whose parents
did not object to their children’s access to these games; this incongruity between the
law’s rationale and its scope rendered the act “vastly overinclusive.”281 In addition, the
272 18 U.S.C. § 48(b) (2006). The language obviously drew from one of the bases for exclud-
ing material from characterization as obscenity. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
273 See Andrew A. Beerworth, United States v. Stevens: A Proposal for Criminalizing Crush
Videos Under Current Free Speech Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 901, 902 (2011) (characterizing
crush videos as “the product of the most depraved and sadistic elements in our society”); see also
Perdue, supra note 100, at 470–71 (describing a crush video in detail).
274 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. In response to Stevens, Congress enacted a more “narrowly
tailored” statute. Id. at 1584; see 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2000 & Supp. 2010).
275 See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) (footnotes omitted) (setting forth a series of established “rules”—e.g., requirement of
ripeness—by which the Court avoids consideration of a substantial portion of constitutional ques-
tions presented to it).
276 See id. at 348; see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–82 (2005); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 251–52 (1999).
277 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
278 See id. at 1588–90. The Court observed that hunting was banned in the District of
Columbia but permitted elsewhere, and that an “enormous national market” existed for hunting-
related depictions. Id. at 1589.
279 See id. at 1590.
280 Id. at 1587 (citation omitted).
281 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741 (2011).
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Court attacked the statute’s lack of regulation in relation to the danger against which it
purportedly sought to guard.282 While the law was premised on the violent tendencies
that video games were thought to induce in minors, it authorized widespread access to
the game through the consent of parents, uncles, and aunts.283 This “seriously under-
inclusive”284 feature was compounded by an even greater one. The testimony to which
California had pointed also contended that comparable feelings of aggression are stimu-
lated by exposure to children’s cartoons on television portraying violence, some video
games approved for children, and pictures of guns.285 For the Court, exclusion of these
media from the law’s regulation left it “wildly”—and fatally—underinclusive.286 At the
same time, the Court broadly implied that extending the regulation to such media would
impart to the law the same overreaching for which the Court faulted the act’s intrusion
into parental decisionmaking.287 Ultimately, then, the Court’s analysis placed the state
in an impossible bind: “[T]he overbreadth in achieving one goal is not cured by the
underbreadth in achieving the other. Legislation such as this, which is neither fish nor
fowl, cannot survive strict scrutiny.”288
Finally, the majority of Justices in Alvarez took square aim at the breadth of the
Stolen Valor Act. Brushing aside Justice Alito’s assertion that Congress had crafted “a
narrow statute that presents no threat to the freedom of speech,”289 Justice Kennedy’s
plurality opinion condemned the Act’s “sweeping, quite unprecedented reach.”290 He
decried the Orwellian implications of ceding to government the power to criminalize
a vast range of innocuous false assertions.291 In its application to false claims of military
honor doing no demonstrable harm and in the disturbing specter of a “broad censorial
power” over speech, the statute suffered from overbreadth’s classic vice of chilling pro-
tected speech.292 Justice Breyer, too—while indicating that Congress was entitled to
enact a more “finely tailored” statute directed at false claims likely to cause specific
harm293—voiced dread of the breadth of expression that approving the statute would
allow government to proscribe.294
282 Id.
283 Id. at 2742.
284 Id. at 2740.
285 Id. at 2739.
286 Id. at 2740.
287 See id. (“California has (wisely) declined to restrict Saturday morning cartoons, the sale
of games rated for young children, or the distribution of pictures of guns.” (emphasis added)).
288 Id. at 2742.
289 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2556 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
290 Id. at 2547 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
291 See id. at 2547–48 (citing GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949)).
292 See id. at 2548; see also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 855 (1991).
293 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555–56 (Breyer, J., concurring).
294 See id. at 2553 (“[T]he pervasiveness of false statements, made for better or for worse
motives, made thoughtlessly or deliberately, made with or without accompanying harm, provides
a weapon to a government broadly empowered to prosecute falsity without more.”).
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B. Voiding for Vagueness
Under the vagueness doctrine, a law regulating speech is facially invalid if it “fails
to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”295
As with overbroad laws, the First Amendment vagueness principle emanates largely
from a concern that vague statutes will deter a substantial amount of protected ex-
pression.296 As with overbreadth’s contrasting lines of decisions as well, however, the
Supreme Court has variously displayed both an insistence on holding restriction of
speech to a relatively high degree of precision and clarity and a reluctance to overturn
entire statutes because they may supply insufficient guidance to parties not before the
Court. At times vigorously enforcing the concept of void-for-vagueness, the Court has
struck down, for example, an obscenity law that deemed criminally obscene the publi-
cation of “collections of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust . . . ‘so massed as to be-
come vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person . . . ’”297 and
a statute that held criminally liable anyone who “publicly . . . treats contemptuously the
flag of the United States.”298 On other occasions, the Court has sustained against vague-
ness challenges an ordinance prohibiting “the making of any noise or diversion which
disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class”299
and a state statute making it illegal to “knowingly approach” someone outside a health-
care facility, without that person’s consent, “for the purpose of passing a leaflet or hand-
bill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with
such other person.”300
When the issue of vagueness was posed in Fox, however, the Court displayed no
ambivalence. The unanimous decision invalidating FCC enforcement of its indecency
rule against Fox and ABC for vagueness included Justice Alito, who conspicuously
dissented in Stevens, Snyder, and Alvarez.301 The Commission had defined indecency
as the depiction of sexual or excretory organs or activities in a manner that was patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
295 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); accord Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 732 (2000); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972).
296 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151
(1959); see Kathryn Marie Dessayer & Arthur J. Burke, Leaving Them Speechless: A Critique
of Speech Restrictions on Campus, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 565, 572–73 (1991); Fallon,
supra note 292, at 904.
297 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 513 (1948).
298 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
299 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 114 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
300 Hill, 530 U.S. at 707 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
301 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2310 (2012). Justice Ginsburg
concurred in the judgment; Justice Sotomayor did not participate. Id. at 2308.
162 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:133
medium, and it elaborated on the factors that would enter into this determination.302
Having previously rejected a challenge to the rule on administrative grounds,303 the
Court now held that the enforcement actions against Fox and ABC failed constitution-
ally because they lacked sufficient notice that what they had televised was proscribed
under the rule.304 The three incidents of alleged indecency consisted of two unscripted
utterances of profanity during live broadcasts of awards shows and the seven-second
appearance of the nude buttocks of an adult female character in an episode of a scripted
series as well as the momentary display of the side of her breast.305 Neither the
Commission’s stated policy nor its regulatory history, the Court found, placed Fox and
ABC on notice that “a fleeting expletive or a brief shot of nudity could be actionably
indecent.”306 Tapping the more vigorous strain of its vagueness jurisprudence, the
Court emphasized the heightened need for fair notice when regulations “touch upon
‘sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms.’”307
Brown as well, though the majority’s invalidation of California’s regulation of
video games did not address vagueness, was notable for Justice Alito’s willingness to
strike down the statute as impermissibly vague.308 For example, to determine whether
a game contained the requisite violence to fall under the restriction, the statute included
as elements “prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors”309
and assessment of whether “[a] reasonable person, considering [a] game as a whole,”
would find that it “appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors.”310 Though
such terms had sufficiently understood meanings in the realm of sex to serve as ade-
quate guideposts for bans on obscenity, Justice Alito observed that no such assump-
tion was warranted with respect to depictions of violence.311 Accordingly, individuals
would lack fair notice as to whether the violence in a particular game fell within the
law’s proscription.312
302 Id. at 2313 (citations omitted). The Commission ascribed significance to three factors:
(1) [T]he explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of
sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells on
or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities;
(3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or
whether the material appears to have been presented for its shock value.
Id. (citation omitted).
303 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (“Fox I”).
304 Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2317–20.
305 See id. at 2314–15.
306 Id. at 2318.
307 Id. (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
308 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742–46 (Alito, J., concurring).
309 Id. at 2745 (citations omitted).
310 Id.
311 See id. at 2745–46.
312 Id. at 2746.
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III. SPEECH-FRIENDLY STARE DECISIS: EXPANSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF
PRECEDENTS’ PROTECTIVE IMPLICATIONS
Interpretation of precedent is the lifeblood of judicial decisionmaking. While the
Supreme Court may sometimes overturn earlier holdings, it generally seeks to maintain
at least the veneer of continuity with previous decisions.313 The relatively few cases that
the Court selects for its docket, however, are almost assured to be ones that require its
resolution because the application of precedent is ambiguous.314 In at least five of the
Court’s six recent decisions on secondary speech explored here, the Court had obvious
precedent on which it could have drawn to sustain the restriction on speech at issue. In
each instance, though, the Court either construed a salient holding to withhold authority
to limit that speech or sustained a facial challenge that declined application of powerful
speech-restrictive precedent.
Snyder offers a pointed illustration of extending a holding in favor of speech be-
yond the specific principle originally announced in that decision. In Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell,315 the Court overturned a verdict for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress (IIED) for publication of a parody advertisement featuring a mock interview with
the plaintiff.316 The opinion set forth clearly the basis for the decision:
[P]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications
such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with
“actual malice,” i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false
or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.317
313 See Welch v. Tex. Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) (stat-
ing that the doctrine of stare decisis is “of fundamental importance to the rule of law”);
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (“Although adherence to precedent is not
rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis de-
mands special justification.”). Stare decisis, however, is thought to operate with less force
in constitutional cases than in statutory construction. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command . . . . This is particularly true in
constitutional cases, because in such cases ‘correction through legislative action is practically
impossible.’” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting))).
314 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (setting forth as two of three principal bases for granting petition for
writ of certiorari conflicts among certain lower courts).
315 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
316 Id. The obviously fictitious interview portrayed the plaintiff “stat[ing] that his ‘first time’
was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.” Id. at 48.
317 Id. at 56 (emphasis added). It was not disputed that the plaintiff was a public figure. Id.
at 57 n.5.
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In light of this language, the Snyder Court could logically have ruled that private figures
like Snyder318 did not have to show actual malice.319 Instead, the Court invoked
Hustler’s broader concern that IIED’s subjective standard of “outrageousness” could
serve as an instrument for venting jurors’ aversion toward particular speech,320 and
it ruled that the defendants’ lawful, peaceful protest on public property on a matter of
public concern321 could not be subject to the plaintiff’s claim for liability.322 Whatever
government’s power to restrict targeted picketing under other circumstances,323 or to
allow for IIED claims on matters of private concern,324 the Snyder Court refused to
limit the First Amendment’s shield against IIED claims to the literal boundaries of its
opinion in Hustler.325
Brown, in turn, demonstrates the opposite phenomenon: insistence on confining the
class of speech found proscribable in a relevant precedent to the specific bounds ad-
dressed in that decision.326 As suggested earlier—and as Justice Breyer urged—the
Court could plausibly have identified the animating principle of Ginsberg v. New
York327 as state authority to adjust standards for regulating sensitive material to the
fragile sensibilities of children.328 Under this expansive construction of Ginsberg, the
defects found fatal by Brown’s majority and concurrence could have received the
318 The Court’s reasoning did not require it to determine Snyder’s status. See Snyder v.
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–16 (2011) (focusing the analysis on speech about the public nature
of the issue). It seems reasonable to assume, however, that Snyder would have been characterized
as a private figure. See id. at 1228 (Alito, J., dissenting) (referring to Snyder as “a vulnerable
private figure”).
319 See Salamanca, supra note 95, at 59 (stating that the Snyder opinion “may have recast
Hustler”); see also Zipursky, supra note 43, at 516 (criticizing the Snyder opinion for failing to
confront the argument that Hustler’s standard for IIED claims was limited to public figures).
320 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (quoting Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55).
321 See supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text.
322 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
323 See id. at 1218–19 (distinguishing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477 (1988) (sustaining
a ban on picketing “before or about” a particular residence) and Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr.,
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (upholding “a buffer zone between protesters and an abortion
clinic entrance”)).
324 See Caroline C. Pace, Snyder v. Phelps: The United States Supreme Court Rules that the
First Amendment Protects Public Speech that Exploits Family’s Grief, 48 HOUS. LAW. 44, 45
(2011), available at http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/mayjune11.htm (asserting that the Snyder
opinion “provide[s] assurances that the Court will not expand the First Amendment to protect
emotionally harmful speech that is predominantly directed at a non-public persons or emotionally
harmful speech that is staged on private property”); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Looking
Back at Cohen v. California: A 40-Year Retrospective from Inside the Court, 20 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 651, 682 (2012) (indicating the view that Snyder “does not address the regulation
of private, apolitical interpersonal speech”).
325 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
326 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741–42 (2011).
327 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
328 See supra notes 204–06, 233 and accompanying text.
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same indulgent scrutiny that left intact New York’s ban on material deemed obscene
as to minors.329 The Court, however, drew a firm demarcation between the sexually
oriented material restricted in Ginsberg and the violence depicted in the video games
involved in Brown.330 “Because speech about violence is not obscene,”331 California’s
statute instead was subjected to the strict scrutiny that proved its undoing.332
Alvarez went even further in its parsing of speech-restrictive precedent. Invalidation
of the Stolen Valor Act entailed distinguishing not a single case but a cluster of them,
and might be viewed as flying in the face of earlier pronouncements. As even Justice
Kennedy’s plurality opinion acknowledged, the Court on multiple occasions had indi-
cated that false statements of fact do not deserve constitutional protection.333 Thus, it
would hardly have been illogical to extrapolate from these repeated assertions a govern-
mental power to punish indisputably false claims of federal military honors.334 Indeed,
prior to the Court’s decision, a number of courts and commentators had drawn exactly
that conclusion.335
For the plurality, however, such reasoning amounted to tearing these “isolated state-
ments” from their “proper context.”336 Any inference that “false statements are unpro-
tected when made to any person, at any time, in any context”337 overlooked two crucial
features of these earlier pronouncements. First, the specific categories of false ex-
pression that the Court had deemed unworthy of protection—e.g., defamation—were
329 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2763–65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the breadth and
imprecision of California’s restriction on violent video games did not exceed those features
in New York’s ban on “nudity”).
330 Id. at 2735.
331 Id.
332 See id. at 2738.
333 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion)
(“For instance, the Court has stated ‘[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless [because]
they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas,’ . . . and that false state-
ments ‘are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.’”
(citations omitted)).
334 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2557 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“These lies have no value in and of
themselves, and proscribing them does not chill any valuable speech.”).
335 See, e.g., United States v. Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Swisher, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1243–45 (D. Idaho 2011); United States v. Robbins, 759 F.
Supp. 2d 815, 819–22 (W.D. Va. 2011); United States v. Perelman, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1221,
1237–39 (D. Nev. 2010); United States v. McGuinn, No. 07 Cr. 471(KNF), 2007 WL 3050502,
at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2007); Josh M. Parker, Comment, The Stolen Valor Act as
Constitutional: Bringing Coherence to First Amendment Analysis of False-Speech Restrictions,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1503 (2011); Mark Tushnet, “Telling Me Lies”: The Constitutionality of
Regulating False Statements of Fact 24 (Harv. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 11-02 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737930; Eugene
Volokh, Comment, Amicus Curiae Brief: Boundaries of the First Amendment’s “False
Statements of Fact” Exception, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 343, 348 (2010).
336 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544–45 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
337 Id. at 2546.
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associated with some “legally cognizable harm.”338 Second, even in these instances, the
Court had generally withheld approval of per se liability for falsehood; a public official
suing for libel, for example, could recover damages only if the defamatory falsehood
was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.”339 Thus, rather than enshrining a “categorical rule”340 that false statements
are devoid of constitutional protection, the cited language reflected more limited gov-
ernment authority to penalize false speech.341 The Stolen Valor Act, which “target[ed]
falsity and nothing more,”342 exceeded that authority.
In Stevens, the Court’s reliance on overbreadth to strike down the law forbidding
depictions of animal cruelty343 sidestepped a powerful argument that the depictions tar-
geted at the statute’s core could be banned under the rationale of New York v. Ferber.344
In Ferber, the Court ruled that child pornography—regardless of whether it meets the
criteria for obscenity—is categorically unprotected.345 Central to the Court’s reasoning
was its determination that child pornography is “intrinsically related”346 to criminal be-
havior because the production of such material constitutes child abuse.347 A wholesale
ban on child pornography was justified as the most effective method to “dry up the mar-
ket” for such material.348 The statute at issue in Stevens thus furnished obvious parallels
with Ferber. Both crush videos and dogfighting videos record crimes and produce (non-
human) victims; their creation is therefore the occasion for commission of a crime.349
338 Id. at 2545; see also id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[I]n virtually all these instances
[in which statutes prohibit lies] limitations of context, requirements of proof of injury, and the
like, narrow the statute to a subset of lies where specific harm is more likely to occur.”).
339 Id. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.




343 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010).
344 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
345 Id. at 764.
346 Id. at 759–61.
347 Id. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002) (distinguishing Ferber
in striking down a ban on virtual child pornography because the absence of actual children meant
that no crime was recorded or victims created). But see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285,
307 (2008) (sustaining a prohibition of offers to provide and solicitations to obtain child pornog-
raphy regardless of whether actual children are depicted).
348 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760.
349 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1599 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]t
appears that these crimes [shown in crush videos] are committed for the sole purpose of creat-
ing the videos.”); Meredith L. Shafer, Note, Perplexing Precedent: United States v. Stevens
Confounds a Century of Supreme Court Conventionalism and Redefines the Limits of
“Entertainment,” 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 326 (2012) (noting that “factual evi-
dence that dogfighting videos drive the illegal act of dogfighting” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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Accordingly, a ban on distribution of these videos could be seen as an indispensable
tool for curbing the criminal conduct depicted.350
For the Stevens Court, however, Ferber represented a “special case”351 in which the
market for child pornography was “an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid
criminal statute.”352 Under the Court’s refusal to construe the statute narrowly, the same
could not be said for the range of expression encompassed by the general category of
depictions of animal cruelty.353 Thus, the Stevens opinion represents a twofold diminu-
tion of Ferber’s significance. First, by retroactively characterizing Ferber as a case in-
volving suppression of speech that was an “integral part” of criminal conduct, the Court
undercut its potential significance as a template for carving out new categories of un-
protected expression. Rather, Stevens reduced Ferber’s holding to identification of “a
previously recognized, long-established category of unprotected speech.”354 Addition-
ally, even if this rationale for Ferber could be applied to crush videos and dogfight-
ing videos,355 Stevens’s willingness to apply the “strong medicine”356 of overbreadth
suggests that only prohibitions finely tailored to the imperatives of “dry[ing] up the
market”357 will survive the doctrine’s newfound vigor.
Finally, the Fox Court’s ruling that the FCC’s enforcement of its indecency policy
was impermissibly vague358 enabled the Court to deflect consideration of whether to
overrule its 1978 decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.359 In Pacifica, the Court re-
jected a First Amendment challenge to the FCC’s ruling that the comedian George
Carlin’s monologue on “Filthy Words” could be barred from broadcast under the
Commission’s indecency policy.360 The Court’s reasoning was grounded in the
350 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1600 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he criminal acts shown in crush
videos cannot be prevented without targeting the conduct prohibited by [the statute] . . . .”);
Beerworth, supra note 273, at 914–15 (“As in Ferber, laws targeting the crushing acts them-
selves are inefficacious due to the secretive, subterranean market for crush videos and the undis-
puted fact that the perpetrators almost never show their faces in the videos.” (citation omitted)).
But see Nadine Strossen, United States v. Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales for
Content-Based Speech Restrictions, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67, 103 (doubting that this
rationale could apply to dogfighting videos because of evidence that “dogfights are conducted
for reasons other than producing and selling videos”).
351 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (citation omitted).
352 Id. (citations omitted).
353 See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
354 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586. See Strossen, supra note 350, at 85 (“Ferber has only limited
capacity to serve as a springboard for judicial recognition of additional categories of unprotected
expression . . . .”). The Court’s cautious approach to recognizing new categories of proscribable
speech is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 372–79.
355 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1602 (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that the statute contained
“a substantial core of constitutionally permissible applications”).
356 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
357 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982).
358 See supra notes 26, 301–07 and accompanying text.
359 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
360 Id. at 729.
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distinctive capacity of broadcast media, which had “established a uniquely perva-
sive presence in the lives of all Americans”361 and were “uniquely accessible to chil-
dren, even those too young to read.”362 In recent years, however, commentators had
contended that the proliferation of alternative media—especially the advent of cable
television and the Internet—had rendered outmoded Pacifica’s premise that radio
broadcasting and television network programming were “uniquely pervasive.”363 This
argument was advanced by the networks as well in Fox as grounds for overruling
Pacifica.364 By invalidating the Commission’s enforcement policy for lack of fair no-
tice, though, the Court found it “unnecessary to reconsider Pacifica at [that] time.”365
IV. HISTORY AS SPEECH-PROTECTIVE
A striking feature of three of the recent decisions involving secondary speech is
their invocation of history as grounds for constraining government power to regulate
speech. While the Court sometimes looks to the “broader, organic purpose”366 originally
underlying a constitutional provision to determine its modern application,367 reliance on
specific historical practice and tradition often operates to limit constitutional rights.
Thus, for example, the Court has denied the presence of state action where the function
in question has not been “traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,”368 and it has
sustained restrictions on access to public property for expressive activity when that type
361 Id. at 748.
362 Id. at 749.
363 See, e.g., Matthew C. Holohan, Note, Politics, Technology, & Indecency: Rethinking
Broadcast Regulation in the 21st Century, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 341, 366–68 (2005); Kristin
L. Rakowski, Branding as an Antidote to Indecency Regulation, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 41
(2009); Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the
First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 306 (2003).
364 See Brief for Petitioners at 48–53, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307
(2012) (No. 10-1293), 2011 WL 3947560, at *48–53; Brief for Respondents at 15–26, FCC
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293), 2011 WL 5373702,
at *15–26.
365 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012).
366 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
367 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010) (“The Framers may not have
anticipated modern business and media corporations . . . but that does not mean that those
speakers and media are entitled to less First Amendment protection than those types of speakers
and media that provided the means of communicating political ideas when the Bill of Rights was
adopted.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 40 (2001) (stating, in deeming the use of sense-enhancing technology to gather information
about the interior of home a “search,” that “we must take the long view, from the original mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment forward”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
847–48 (1992).
368 Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 55–56 (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of property has not historically been held open for such expression.369 In the realm of
substantive due process as well, insistence that a right be “objectively[ ] ‘deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition’”370 to qualify as fundamental has caused the
asserted right to be rejected.371 In Stevens, Brown, and Alvarez, however, reliance on
particular strains of history and tradition served to limit the government’s ability to re-
strict expression. In each case, the Court refused to designate as unprotected a class
of speech whose proscribability had not been clearly established by historic and
traditional sanction.
The Court in Stevens announced its reluctance to carve out novel categories of
expression beyond the reach of the First Amendment. To support its contention that
depictions of animal cruelty do not warrant protection, the government had pointed to
the Court’s famous characterization of certain categories of unprotected speech in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire372 as being “of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social in-
terest in order and morality.”373 The Court, however, denied that this passage signi-
fied the Court’s willingness to forge new categories of unprotected speech through
an “ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”374 Rather than employing
such a “simple cost-benefit analysis”375 to identify classes of expression outside the
scope of the First Amendment, the Court emphasized the exacting standard of specific
historic lineage.376 Looking all the way back to the passage of the Bill of Rights, the
Court underscored the age and sparseness of existing categories: “‘From 1791 to the
present’ . . . the First Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of speech
in a few limited areas,’ and has never ‘include[d] a freedom to disregard these tradi-
tional limitations.’”377 In the same vein, the Court observed that “[t]hese ‘historic and
traditional categories long familiar to the bar[ ]’ . . . are ‘well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech . . . .’”378 Given these stringent criteria, it was unsurprising
that the Court declined to add depiction of animal cruelty to the roster of recognized
categories. While actual animal cruelty had a long history of prohibition, the same
could not be said of depictions of animal cruelty.379
369 See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828, 838 (1976).
370 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citation omitted).
371 See, e.g., id. (rejecting right to assistance in committing suicide); see also Dist. Attorney’s
Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322 (2009).
372 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
373 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (citation omitted).
374 Id.
375 Id. at 1586.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 1584 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992)).
378 Id. (citations omitted).
379 Id. at 1585.
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A year later, the Court in Brown affirmed both historical tradition as the touchstone
for ascertaining unprotected speech and its protective approach to identifying the rele-
vant tradition.380 Only a handful of areas—e.g., obscenity, incitement, fighting words—
had traditionally been deemed wholly unworthy of protection.381 The Court acknowl-
edged the possibility of speech that has been historically unprotected but not addressed
in the Court’s jurisprudence, and thus of sustaining a new ban on content as “part of a
long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.”382 No such “longstanding
tradition” existed, however, of restricting minors’ access to depictions of violence.383
In seeking to limit children’s access to violent video games, California had not “ad-
just[ed] the boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech” to make its defi-
nition appropriate for children.384 Rather, the state had justified its restriction through
the type of balancing test rejected in Stevens, which Brown described as holding that
“new categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that
concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”385 As in Stevens, the Court re-
fused to allow this calculus to replace the license of history.
In Alvarez as well, the Court adhered to a strict historical criterion for classes of
unprotected expression. Spurning the government’s attempt to treat lies about military
honors as categorically proscribable, Justice Kennedy’s opinion repeated Stevens’s ob-
servation that content-based restrictions have generally been limited to a few “historic
and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar.”386 The categories’
“historical foundation in the Court’s free speech tradition” had demonstrated the com-
patibility of these enclaves with the Court’s larger commitment to free expression.387
By contrast, the government had failed to meet its heavy burden of showing that false
statements generally should be newly recognized as a category of speech traditionally
subject to proscription.388
V. A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF OFFICIAL FACTUAL CLAIMS
It is a commonplace of constitutional law that the level of scrutiny applied to
challenged legislation typically disposes of its validity. Thus, statutes reviewed under
the rational relationship standard almost invariably survive this exceedingly lenient
380 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
381 Id. at 2733.
382 Id. at 2734.
383 Id. at 2736.
384 Id. at 2735 (emphasis added).
385 Id. at 2734.
386 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
387 Id.
388 Id. at 2547.
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approach.389 Conversely, laws subjected to the demanding justification required by
strict scrutiny are rarely upheld.390 In the cases discussed in this Article, the Court has
often displayed notable skepticism toward the rationale offered by the government
for limiting expression. While the Court has sometimes afforded significant latitude
to factual premises underlying restrictions of secondary speech,391 its examination
of explanations for the speech regulations in these recent cases has been anything
but deferential.
This note of skepticism was emphatically struck by the Stevens Court in the first
of these cases. Indeed, the Court in Stevens disavowed not only the factual predicate of
389 See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26–28 (1989); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 730–32 (1963) (stating that in reviewing for compliance with substantive due process in the
commercial and business sphere, “[w]e refuse to sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom
of legislation’” (citation omitted)); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (stating
that in general equal protection is violated “only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrel-
evant to the achievement of the State’s objective” and that “[a] statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it” (citations omitted));
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955); RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL.,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.3 (3d ed. 1999) (stating
that a classification will be sustained if “it is conceivable that the classification bears a rational
relationship to an end of government which is not prohibited by the Constitution”).
390 See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 (2011)
(striking down a state statute providing matching funds for political candidates under certain cir-
cumstances under the principle that laws burdening political speech are “subject to strict scrutiny,
which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest” (citation omitted)); Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (striking down a restriction on voting not shown to
be “necessary to promote a compelling state interest”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1451 (2d ed. 1988) (“When expressed as a standard for judicial review,
strict scrutiny is . . . ‘strict’ in theory and usually ‘fatal’ in fact.”) (quoting Gerald Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
391 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (O’Connor,
J., plurality opinion); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 641 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to the Court’s permitting “a few pages of self-serving and unsupported
statements by the State” to serve as the basis for upholding a rule forbidding lawyers to use direct
mail to solicit personal injury or wrongful death clients within thirty days of an accident); City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (“The First Amendment does
not require a city, before enacting . . . an ordinance [restricting the location of adult motion pic-
ture theaters], to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated
by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be
relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
58, 60–61 (1973) (upholding a ban on the display of obscenity at an adult theater on the basis that
“there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime” and stating that
“[a]lthough there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene
material, the legislature . . . could quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or
might exist”).
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the sweeping ban on depictions of animal cruelty, but also the larger project of enlarg-
ing the list of unprotected categories of speech through empirical calculation.392
Moreover, while Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion left open the possibility that a more
narrowly crafted statute aimed at dogfighting videos and crush videos might be up-
held,393 the opinion is equivocal on this score. At a minimum, the opinion appeared to
place on the government a heavy burden of justification to demonstrate that a desig-
nated class of speech could be suppressed because it was “intrinsically related”394 to
criminal conduct.395
In Brown, the Court’s repudiation of a “simple balancing test”396 for identifying un-
protected classes of speech397 was coupled with an assessment of the State’s evidence
that verged on the incredulous.398 Assessing the research on which California based the
putative link between exposure to violent video games and harm to children, Justice
Scalia caustically observed that these studies had been “rejected by every court to con-
sider them.”399 He then explained the flaws in the studies’ methodology.400 For the
Court, this tenuous foundation fell well short of meeting the state’s burden to justify
such a restriction: “The State must specifically identify an ‘actual problem’ in need of
solving, and the curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the solution.
That is a demanding standard.”401 Nor does the Court’s opinion appear to hold out
much prospect—as Justice Alito argued in his concurrence402—that evolving tech-
nology could later change the Court’s calculus. The Court’s disdain for the evidence
presented by the State suggests a broader presumption of invalidity that only the
most exhaustive and cogent data might overcome.403 Indeed, the Court’s suspicion of
392 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585–86 (2010) (refusing to rely on “ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits” or “simple cost-benefit analysis” to identify
such categories).
393 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
394 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982)).
395 See id.; see also Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict
Injury”: The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and
Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 358–59 (2009) (“[T]he linkage requirements—the doctrinal
rules that express the required connection between the potentially dangerous utterance and
the ensuing harm—have tightened.”); Strossen, supra note 350, at 86 (“[T]he Court has con-
sistently resisted attempts to extend the drying-up-the-market rationale beyond the specific
context of child pornography.” (footnote omitted)).
396 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (quoting Stevens, 130 S.
Ct. at 1585) (internal quotation marks omitted).
397 Id.
398 See id. at 2734–35.
399 Id. at 2739.
400 Id.
401 Id. at 2738 (citations omitted).
402 Id. at 2742–46 (Alito, J., concurring).
403 See Robert Corn-Revere, Moral Panics, the First Amendment, and the Limits of Social
Science, 28 COMM. LAW. 3, 4 (2011) (“The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Brown that when Mom
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California’s factual rationale seems the virtual antithesis of the deference that Justice
Breyer called for in his dissent.404
A similar debate and outcome occurred in Sorrell as well. There, Justice Breyer
urged deference toward Vermont’s determination that limitations on the purchase of
physician-identifiable prescription data would constructively address serious problems:
“[I]t is the job of regulatory agencies and legislatures to make just these kinds of judg-
ments.”405 The Sorrell majority, however, flatly disputed the State’s judgment. The
Court chided the State for its failure to demonstrate that detailers’ use of prescriber-
identifying information posed unique harms to the doctor-patient relationship.406 In
addition, it summarily dismissed Vermont’s asserted interest in preserving physician
confidentiality: “Given the information’s widespread availability and many permis-
sible uses, the State’s asserted interest in physician confidentiality does not justify the
burden that [the restriction] places on protected expression.”407
In Alvarez, the skepticism displayed by Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion toward
the government’s showing was twofold. First, as in Brown, the government failed to
establish to the plurality’s satisfaction “a direct causal link between the restriction im-
posed and the injury to be prevented.”408 Here, the government had not demonstrated
that the Stolen Valor Act’s prohibition on false claims of military honors fostered the
integrity of the awards system.409 Moreover, even if the ban promoted that goal, the
government could not persuade the plurality that other means less restrictive of speech
were unavailable.410 In particular, the plurality proposed creation of an online govern-
ment database officially listing winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor.411 Con-
sistent with the doubting tenor of the opinion, the plurality found the government’s
contention that such a database was not feasible simply unsupported by the record.412
or Dad chooses which games are appropriate for the kids, it is called parenting; but when the
government does so, it is called censorship.”); James Dunkelberger, Comment, The New
Resident Evil? State Regulation of Violent Video Games and the First Amendment, 2011
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1659, 1679–92 (anticipating that future attempts to restrict minors’ access
to violent video games will be judicially thwarted).
404 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2770 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
405 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2682 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see
Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 480–81, 485–91 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court should grant greater latitude to states to regulate attorneys’ advertis-
ing and solicitation).
406 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670–71.
407 Id. at 2668.
408 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion)
(citing Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738).
409 Id.
410 Id. (“The Government has not shown, and cannot show, why counter-speech would not
suffice to achieve its interest.” (emphasis added)).
411 Id. at 2551.
412 See id.
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While the remaining cases—Fox and Snyder—did not explicitly hinge on question-
ing the government’s factual premises, the decisions nonetheless involved judicial im-
position of contrary perceptions of circumstances. Because Fox’s invalidation of the
FCC’s enforcement action rested on vagueness doctrine, the Court did not need to con-
front the issue of whether advances in communications since Pacifica had rendered
that decision’s technological assumptions obsolete.413 Still, the Court’s ruling that the
networks had been given inadequate notice by the Commission’s indecency policy414
entailed rejection of the FCC’s contention that the networks must have realized that
their broadcasts had offended the policy.415 Confronted with the FCC’s and networks’
competing versions of reality, the Court dismissed the government’s argument.416
In Snyder, too, the debate swirled not over the accuracy of specific facts but over
characterization of mindsets. For example, the Court did not dispute expert testimony
at trial that Snyder’s anguish over the picketing had caused him severe depression and
had aggravated pre-existing health conditions;417 indeed, the Court virtually endorsed
that diagnosis.418 Conversely, Snyder did not assert that he was immediately affected
by the picket signs; he acknowledged that he did not see their messages until watching
a news broadcast later.419 Rather, the dispute between the majority and Justice Alito—
who supported this action under Maryland law—ultimately involved clashing as-
sessments of the understanding that typical viewers would take from the signs.420 As
discussed earlier, protection of Westboro’s speech derived from treating it as expres-
sion on a matter of public concern.421 In regarding the signs as essentially commentary
on public issues instead of a personal attack on Snyder’s family, the Court effectively
ascribed this perspective to those who saw the signs. As in defamation law, liability or
its absence was rooted in the meaning that contested speech conveyed to reasonable
readers.422 This amounts to a factual determination, if an inevitably speculative one.
413 See supra notes 363–64 and accompanying text.
414 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317–20 (2012).
415 See id. at 2319.
416 Id.
417 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 (2011).
418 See id. at 1217–18 (“The record makes clear that the applicable legal term—‘emotional
distress’—fails to capture fully the anguish Westboro’s choice added to Mr. Snyder’s already
incalculable grief.”).
419 Id. at 1213–14.
420 See, e.g., id. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the possible interpretations of
the signs).
421 See supra notes 85, 92–95 and accompanying text.
422 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1991) (holding that
liability in a libel action for an altered quotation depends on the meaning placed on the quoted
statement by a reasonable reader); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 1 n.3 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he operative question” to determine whether a plaintiff
may recover for an allegedly libelous implication is “whether reasonable readers would have
actually interpreted the statement as implying defamatory facts”).
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CONCLUSION
It is no novelty to observe that free speech doctrine often lends itself to ambiguous
application in cases the Court is called on to decide. The striking feature of recent deci-
sions discussed in this Article is the consistency with which the Court has resolved such
ambiguities to shield speech where restriction offered a plausible alternative. At every
turn, a majority of Justices chose to safeguard expression widely thought unworthy of
solicitude. Such expression may have been secondary in the eyes of the government,
but the Court saw its protection as primary.
